Category: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
Auto Added by WPeMatico
Also Changes Required Participation in the CJR Model
On August 15, 2017, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) issued a proposed rule (Proposed Rule) that, if finalized, would (1) reduce the number of Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in which there is mandatory participation in the Comprehensive Care Joint Replacement model (CJR) from 67 to 34, and (2) cancel the mandatory Episode Payment Models and Cardiac Rehabilitation incentive payment program. The action reflects a change in course for CMS, de-emphasizing and significantly reducing mandatory participation in Alternative Payment Programs.
Reduced Mandatory Participation in CJR Model
The CJR model originally became effective on April 1, 2016 and mandated that hospitals in 67 specified MSAs must participate in an episode-based payment program for hip and knee joint replacements. The Proposed Rule, anticipated to be effective as of February 1, 2018, reduces the mandatory participation in the CJR essentially by one half to 34 MSAs (see Table 1 below taken from the proposed rule for the remaining MSAs).
The remaining MSAs have the highest average wage-adjusted historic episode payments, that is, the counties with the highest average expense cost for the episodes involved. Under the Proposed Rule, hospitals in the other 33 MSAs would no longer be required to participate in the CJR model, but they may elect voluntarily to participate in that program by submitting a participation election letter to CMS by January 31, 2018. In addition, within the 34 MSAs for which participation is mandatory, identified low volume or rural hospitals also would no longer be required to participate, but they may elect voluntarily to do so.
According to CMS, the remaining 34 MSAs for which participation is mandatory will provide sufficient information to evaluate the effects of the CJR model across a broad range of providers. The higher costs in these MSAs also allows the participating hospitals a greater opportunity for showing improvement through participation in the CJR model.
Cancellation of EPM and Cardiac Rehabilitation Incentive Program
The Proposed Rule also seeks to cancel the Episode Payment Model (EPM), that would have expanded mandatory participation in an episode-based payment to hospitals in a number of MSAs for acute myocardial infarctions, coronary artery bypass grafts and surgical hip/femur fracture treatment, and a Cardiac Rehabilitation Incentive payment model that was to be implemented simultaneously with the EPM. Regulations for both models were originally issued on July 25, 2016 and are described here.
What Does All This Mean?
The Proposed Rule shows CMS does not favor mandatory participation in Alternative Payment Programs. As CMS states in the commentary to the Proposed Rule “requiring hospitals to participate in episode payment models at this time is not in the best interests of the agency or affected providers.” CMS further explained that large mandatory episode-based payment models “may impede [the] ability to engage providers, such as hospitals, in future voluntary efforts.”
While CMS and the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation have introduced many Alternative Payment Programs which move reimbursement to providers away from fee-for-service reimbursement toward reimbursement models focused on efficiency, delivery of value, and quality care, some have thought the pace of the transition to value-based care has been slower than anticipated. Since Alternative Payment Models are viewed as an effective way to restrain health care cost increases, some view that such slower pace will mean providers will not be required to take steps necessary to be more efficient and reduce costs. Cancellation of and reductions in mandatory programs will allow providers to avoid, at least for the near term, preparing themselves for such models given the lack of any requirement to do so.
At the same time, voluntary participation ensures participants in such models are committed to and engaged in the value-based models. The continued evaluation of such models with voluntary participants also helps ensure that access to care, quality, and favorable outcomes are not adversely affected by mandatory participation of providers not ready for such programs.
Commercial payor arrangements and market incentives aimed at helping providers to become more efficient are not directly affected by the Proposed Rule. Their presence may still encourage providers to voluntarily participate in Alternative Payment Models.
Powered by WPeMatico
Telehealth providers can celebrate another successful year of growth, as CMS reported a 28% increase over total 2016 payments for telehealth services under the Medicare program. Providers continue to successfully integrate telehealth services into their traditional health care delivery approaches, and are realizing payment opportunities both within the Medicare FFS program and in other sources of revenue. Our thanks to POLITICO Pro Morning eHealth Reporter, David Pittman, who first reported on the story and shared the claims data.
2016 Medicare Telehealth Claims Data
Let’s review the numbers. In CY 2016, Medicare paid a total of $28,748,210 for telehealth services, spread across a total of 496,396 claims. This includes payments to distant site providers and originating site payments. Compare this amount to last year, in which Medicare paid a total of $22,449,968 for telehealth services, spread across a total of 372,518 claims. (The figures are slightly different than reported in prior years, as CMS changed its data collection and calculation methodology this year.)
The result: 2016 saw a 33% increase in the number of Medicare telehealth claims submitted and a 28% increase in total payments. This uptick in total payments is not attributable to fee schedule rate increases, but rather to more providers using telehealth services with their traditional Medicare FFS beneficiaries.
More Originating Site Claims Filed Than Ever Before
Perhaps the most interesting element in the new data is the significant increase in originating site claims (HCPCS Code Q3014).. Before 2015, approximately half of all distant site claims did not have a corresponding originating site claim. This gap has closed in the last two years, and in 2016, 66% of all distant site claims had a corresponding originating site claim. The remaining gap could be due to providers not bothering to bill for the $25 originating site facility fee, or it could be that some claims were billed when the patient was located at home (a different site of service for which a facility would not bill). The federal Office of Inspector General at the Department of Health & Human Services has announced a new audit project to review Medicare payments for telehealth services and understand the reason(s) for this gap.
Despite the increase, Medicare’s $28.7 million payments in 2016 remains a small portion of the $600+ billion overall Medicare program budget. Remember: in 2001, the Congressional Budget Office estimated it would cost the Medicare program $150 million to cover telehealth services for the first five years ($30 million a year). Fifteen years later, total payments (2011-2016) still have not cracked that $150 million forecast and annual spend has not hit $30 million.
Medicare Coverage of Telehealth Services is Limited
Coverage of telehealth services under Medicare remains limited, with the restrictions established via statute under the Social Security Act. Any notable expansion of telehealth coverage under Medicare would require legislation by Congress. There are several bills pending in Congress to remove these limitations, but until such time, there are five main conditions for coverage for telehealth services under Medicare.
- The beneficiary is located in a qualifying rural area (providers can check if the originating site is in a qualifying rural area by using the Medicare Telehealth Payment Eligibility Analyzer);
- The beneficiary is located at one of eight qualifying originating sites (i.e., the offices of physicians or practitioners; Hospitals; Critical Access Hospitals; Rural Health Clinics; Federally Qualified Health Centers; Hospital-based or CAH-based Renal Dialysis Centers (including satellites); Skilled Nursing Facilities; and Community Mental Health Centers);
- The services are provided by one of ten distant site practitioners eligible to furnish and receive Medicare payment for telehealth services (i.e., physicians; nurse practitioners;™physician assistants;™nurse-midwives;™ clinical nurse specialists;™ certified registered nurse anesthetists; clinical psychologists; clinical social workers; registered dietitians; and nutrition professionals);
- The beneficiary and distant site practitioner communicate via an interactive audio and video telecommunications system that permits real-time communication between them (store and forward is covered in Alaska and Hawaii under demonstration programs); and
- The CPT/HCPCS (Current Procedural Terminology/Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System) code for the service itself is named on the CY 2017 (or current year) list of covered Medicare telehealth services.
In order to bill Medicare for telehealth services, the distant site practitioner must fully comply with each of these requirements. If the service does not meet each of these above requirements, the Medicare program will not pay for the service. If, however, the conditions of coverage are met, the use of an interactive telecommunications system substitutes for an in-person encounter (i.e., it satisfies the “face-to-face” element of a service).
How to Request Additional Medicare Telehealth Services
Providers and other interested parties need not wait on federal legislation to pass. Anyone may send CMS a request to add services (HCPCS codes) to the list of covered Medicare telehealth services. This can include medical specialty societies, individual physicians or practitioners, hospitals, state and federal agencies, telehealth companies, vendors, and even patients. Requests may be submitted at any time on an ongoing basis. The requests will be consolidated and considered during the CMS rulemaking cycle that establishes the physician fee schedule rates.
Each request should address the following:
- Name(s), address(es) and contact information of the requestor.
- The HCPCS code(s) that describes the service(s) proposed for addition or deletion to the list of Medicare telehealth services. If the requestor does not know the applicable HCPCS code, the request should include a description of services furnished during the telehealth session.
- A description of the type(s) of medical professional(s) providing the telehealth service at the distant site.
- A detailed discussion of the reasons the proposed service should be added to the definition of Medicare telehealth service.
- An explanation as to why the requested service cannot be billed under the current scope of telehealth services, for example, the reason why the HCPCS codes currently on the list of Medicare telehealth services would not be appropriate for billing the service requested.
- Evidence that supports adding the service(s) to the list on either a category 1 or category 2 basis as explained in the section labeled “CMS Criteria for Submitted Requests.”
Email your request to Telehealth_Review_Process@cms.hhs.gov and title it “Telehealth Review Process.” Alternatively, you can mail the request to: Division of Practitioner Services, Mail Stop: C4-03-06, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 7500 Security Boulevard Baltimore, Maryland 21244-1850. Attention: Telehealth Review Process.
Continued expansions in reimbursement mean providers should make enhancements to telehealth programs now, both for the immediate cost savings and growing opportunities for revenue generation, to say nothing of patient quality and satisfaction.
For more information on telemedicine, telehealth, and virtual care innovations, including the team, publications, and other materials, visit Foley’s Telemedicine Practice.
Powered by WPeMatico
Ninth Circuit Victory Opens the Door to Medicaid Reimbursement Challenges Based on Equal Access Requirement
The Ninth Circuit held August 7 that the Department of Health and Human Services Secretary erred in approving a Medicaid State Plan Amendment (SPA) that cut reimbursement for outpatient hospital services in California by 10% for eight months in 2008-2009. The Hoag Memorial decision sided with the 57 hospitals that challenged the SPA under the theory that the reimbursement cut violated the federal Medicaid requirement that payment rates be sufficient to provide Medicaid beneficiaries with equal access to care and services.
In Hoag Memorial, the Court Did Not Defer to the Secretary’s Interpretation of the Medicaid Statute
The decision is particularly significant because prior Ninth Circuit caselaw had largely deferred to the Secretary when considering how reimbursement cuts would impact the availability of Medicaid services. In 2013, the court rejected a hospital challenge in Managed Pharmacy Care v. Sebelius, in which plaintiffs had alleged that a reimbursement cut did not satisfy the Medicaid requirement under section 1902(a)(30)(A) of the Social Security Act (Section 1902(a)(30)(A)) to “assure that payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care” because the Secretary did not consider provider costs.
Hoag Memorial distinguished Managed Pharmacy Care by relying on a different clause in section 1902(a)(30)(A). The court wrote that the requirement that payments “are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services are available under the plan at least to the extent that such care and services are available to the general population in the geographic area,” unambiguously expressed Congress’ intent such that the court need not defer to the Secretary’s interpretation about whether the requirement was met. It said that the equal-access requirement is a “concrete standard, objectively measurable against the health care access afforded among the general population,” in contrast to the “broad and diffuse” requirement that payments be “consistent with efficiency, economy and quality of care.” Based on this analysis, the court held that the Secretary’s approval of the SPA was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because it failed to consider Medicaid beneficiaries’ access to care relative to that of the general (i.e., non-Medicaid) population.
The APA’s Role in Challenging Medicaid State Plan Amendments
About two years ago, in Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, the United States Supreme Court rejected a Section 1902(a)(30)(A) Medicaid reimbursement challenge brought against the state of Idaho for lack of a viable cause of action. In that case, the plaintiff providers had argued that they were entitled to challenge the sufficiency of Idaho’s Medicaid rates pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. The Courtheld that the Supremacy Clause “instructs courts what to do when state and federal law clash, but is silent regarding who may enforce federal laws in court, and in what circumstances they may do so.” The Court also asserted that “the Medicaid Act implicitly precludes private enforcement of §30(A)” and expressed skepticism of efforts to “circumvent Congress’s exclusion of private enforcement.” Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s observation that the Medicaid Act precludes private enforcement, Hoag Memorial allowed a challenge to the sufficiency of Medicaid rates in federal court based on the express statutory cause of action in section 702 of the APA for persons who suffer legal wrong because of agency action.
CMS is Likely to React to the Decision by Considering Additional Evidence When Approving Medicaid Reimbursement SPAs
The holding in Hoag Memorial relied on what the court found to be the Secretary’s failure to consider any evidence regarding the general population’s access to care and services. In the court’s view, such oversight rendered it logically impossible for the Secretary to meet the statutory standard because there could be no way of proving that Medicaid beneficiaries had at least the same level of access to care and services as the general population if the Secretary did not know anything about the general population’s access. Without the ability to make the statutorily mandated comparison, it was not enough that the administrative record included evidence that Medi-Cal beneficiary utilization of hospital outpatient services had not decreased after the payment cut, nor that it included evidence that just as many hospitals provided outpatient services to Medi-Cal beneficiaries.
In 2015, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) issued a final rule requiring states considering reductions or restructuring of Medicaid reimbursement that could have an adverse impact on beneficiary access to care to conduct access reviews and submit those findings to CMS along with the request for approval of the reimbursement change. Although the rule references section 1902(a)(30)(A), it does not provide detailed instruction about the evidence that CMS needs from states to evaluate whether the equal-access-to-service component of section 1902(a)(30)(A) has been satisfied. CMS may propose modifications to the rule in response to the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, and begin directing states to submit the kind of evidence the court did not find in the administrative record in Hoag Memorial —either studies directly comparing access to care and services for Medicaid beneficiaries with access for the general population, or independent evidence of the level of access for both groups that CMS can compare when evaluating the SPA.
If CMS modifies the information it requires states to submit in an access review, or if states independently collect comparison data as part of their access reviews, the next round of litigation over equal access for Medicaid beneficiaries may focus not on the Secretary’s failure to consider any evidence at all, but on whether the Secretary considered the right kinds of evidence and drew reasonable conclusions from it. If so, the question of deference will again become paramount because plaintiffs will continue to face uphill battles challenging SPA approvals if courts defer to CMS’ evaluation and interpretation of the evidence. On the one hand, the complexity of the Medicaid program and CMS’ agency expertise in administering it may counsel in favor of deference to the agency. But on the other hand, plaintiffs are likely to argue that deference is not warranted based on the court’s statement in Hoag Memorial that a “straightforward comparison of data under the equal-access requirement would derive little benefit from the Secretary’s expertise.”
It is also possible that the federal government will appeal Hoag Memorial by requesting en banc review at the Ninth Circuit or by appealing to the Supreme Court. As of publication of this article, no petition for further review had been filed.
The Path for Future Medicaid Reimbursement Challenges
Ultimately, Hoag Memorial proves the continuing viability of section 1902(a)(30)(A) challenges to Medicaid reimbursement, even after the defeats for providers in the last few years in the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court. While APA litigation over the federal approval of Medicaid SPAs is likely to remain challenging for plaintiffs, Hoag Memorial potentially lays the groundwork for future equal-access-to-care arguments and provides support for an argument that courts need not defer to CMS’ conclusions if they are convinced that the Medicaid statute is clear.
Copyright 2017, American Health Lawyers Association, Washington, DC. Reprint permission granted.
Powered by WPeMatico
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has demonstrated that it will not hesitate to use one of its most crippling administrative enforcement tools—the revocation of Medicare billing privileges—against one of its largest suppliers, as is evident in its case against Arriva Medical, LLC. Medicare billing privileges may be revoked for any one (or more) of several grounds laid out in the regulations at 42 C.F.R. § 424.535. In this case, CMS relied upon 42 C.F.R. § 424.535(a)(8), “abuse of billing privileges,” and specifically subsection (i)(A), regarding the submission of a claim for an item or service that could not have been furnished to a specific individual on the date of service because the beneficiary was deceased.
A revocation of billing privileges precludes payment for any claims submitted after the effective date of the revocation, and is accompanied by a ban on re-enrollment. A revocation has much the same impact as an exclusion imposed by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG), i.e., no Medicare payment, and in some cases revocations have been imposed after OIG declined to exclude an individual or entity.1 A Medicare revocation can also result in similar actions under Medicaid.
Arriva provides diabetic testing supplies under Medicare’s competitive bidding program, and describes itself as the nation’s largest supplier of home-delivered diabetic testing supplies.2 In October 2016, Arriva was notified by CMS that its billing privileges would be revoked, effective November 4, 2016, with a three year ban on reenrollment, due to the submission of Medicare claims for deceased beneficiaries. On December 6, 2016, Arriva was notified that its competitive bidding contract would be terminated effective January 20, 2017, based upon its lack of Medicare billing privileges.
Arriva filed for administrative review of the revocation of its billing privileges, an appeal that as of this writing is pending with the Departmental Appeals Board (DAB), and filed for a temporary restraining order and injunctive relief in light of the upcoming deadline for termination of its competitive bid contract. In its filing, Arriva alleged that the revocation was based upon 211 claims (0.003%) for supplies shipped to beneficiaries after they had died, out of approximately 5.8 million claims over a five-year period.3 Arriva further noted that CMS found concerns with the supporting claims documentation for 47 of those 211 beneficiaries. However, Arriva argued that any errors in billing for these claims after the beneficiary died were primarily the result of Medicare system flaws, and the revocation itself was related to the backlog of claims appeals before the Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals.
Defendants (HHS) responded by filing an Opposition to Plaintiff’s First Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction and Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Defendants’ Opposition), in which it was reported that CMS had advised Arriva that CMS was willing to defer the termination of the competitive bidding contract until such time as the DAB rendered the final agency decision on the revocation. Defendants’ Opposition notes that several courts have addressed revocation actions imposed by CMS, including allegations of imminent and irreparable harm, and have dismissed the complaints for lack of jurisdiction. Here, HHS again argued that administrative exhaustion is required before revocation disputes can be heard by a court. Moreover, HHS argued that a post-deprivation avenue for appeal did not violate the supplier’s due process rights, with a lengthy discussion of case law on this issue. Defendants’ Opposition also includes a lengthy discussion of Defendants’ view on the standard for granting a TRO, including arguments that the case law does not support a finding of “irreparable harm” for health care entities even against allegations that they might have to shut down as a result of the challenged action.
By minute order entered on January 4, 2017, the request for a TRO was denied, with the court setting a schedule for plaintiff to file a renewed motion for preliminary injunction and for defendant to file an opposition to that motion as well as a motion to dismiss. The hearing on both motions is currently scheduled for February 8, 2017.
This case should be closely watched for its evaluation of CMS’ revocation authorities.
Originally, this post was an alert sent to the American Health Lawyers Association’s (AHLA) Regulation, Accreditation, and Payment Practice Group Members. It appears here with permission. For more information, visit AHLA’s website.
1 For a discussion of the difference between exclusions and revocations, see Desfosses v. Noridian Healthcare Solutions, LLC, 2015 WL 1196018 (Mar. 16, 2015).
2 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Arriva Medical, LLC v United States Department of Health and Human Services, Case No. 1:16-cv-02521-JEB (D.D.C.).
Powered by WPeMatico
HRSA Announces Final Rule on Civil Monetary Penalties for Drug Manufacturers that Overcharge 340B Covered Entities
A new regulation issued by the Health Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”) sets forth a process by which civil monetary penalties may be imposed on drug manufacturers that knowingly and intentionally charge 340B covered entities for covered outpatient drugs more than the statutory ceiling price. The regulation addresses the ceiling price calculation for drugs purchased pursuant to the 340B Drug Pricing Program (“340B Program”), and provides that drug manufacturers may be subject to a civil monetary penalty of up to $5,000 for each instance of overcharging. The regulation finalizes a proposal dating back to June 2015. The regulation will be enforced beginning on April 1, 2017.
The civil monetary penalties would not be calculated and imposed by HRSA’s Office of Pharmacy Affairs, but by the Office of Inspector General (“OIG”). The civil monetary penalties would be in addition to any refunds to covered entities that may be required by the 340B Program. The final rule does not provide a mechanism for covered entities to file a complaint against a drug manufacturer for overcharging for 340B drugs. Once HRSA’s 340B administrative dispute resolution rules are finalized and the appropriate system has been established, a covered entity could submit a claim against a manufacturer for an instance of overcharging for administrative dispute resolution.
The new regulation requires drug manufacturers to calculate the 340B ceiling price for each covered outpatient drug, by National Drug Code (NDC), on a quarterly basis. The 340B ceiling price is based on the Average Manufacturer Price (AMP) for the prior quarter, minus a Unit Rebate Amount. For new drugs, manufacturers will need to estimate the 340B ceiling price and then calculate the actual 340B ceiling price once the appropriate data is available. If an overcharge has a occurred as a result of this estimation, drug manufacturers must refund or credit a covered entity the difference between the estimated and actual 340B ceiling price within one hundred and twenty days. Overcharges may also occur if a drug manufacture does not credit or refund a covered entity after subsequent recalculations of the ceiling price by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Service (“CMS”). Overcharges are determined on an NDC code basis, and may not be offset by other discounts the manufacturer provides on any other NDC. Drug manufacturers are also required to ensure that 340B discounts are provided through distribution arrangements made by the manufacturer.
The new regulation is based upon a requirement set forth in the Affordable Care Act, and comes at a time when drug prices and the 340B Program are receiving heightened scrutiny by the incoming Congress and administration. We will continue to report on modifications to the 340B Program as they develop.
Powered by WPeMatico
The Joint Commission, which accredits hospitals and other health care organizations, recently announced it will not permit hospitals and other health care organizations to use secure text messaging platforms to transmit orders. The announcement is the most recent in a back-and-forth series of guidance statements regarding the use of secure messaging in hospitals and other health care organizations.
In a 2011 FAQ, the Joint Commission stated it was not acceptable for physicians or licensed independent practitioners to text orders for patient care, treatment, or services to hospitals or other health care settings. The Joint Commission reversed its position in May 2016, stating providers could “text orders as long as a secure text messaging platform is used and the required components of an order are included.” The Joint Commission credited the evolution of health care communications technology as part of the reason for its decision to reexamine and allow provider text messaging. Then, in July 2016, the Joint Commission “hit unsubscribe” on its guidance and delayed the use of text messaging until it had time to further consider the clinical and operational implications.
During that period, the Joint Commission worked with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) to develop guidelines for text-message-based orders to ensure consistency with the Medicare’s Conditions of Participation. As a result of this collaboration, The Joint Commission and CMS developed a set of recommendations contained in its new clarification on the use of messaging for patient care orders. The guidance is summarized as follows:
- All health care organizations should have policies prohibiting the use of unsecured text messaging – that is, short message service (“SMS”) text messaging from a personal mobile device – for communicating protected health information.
- Computerized provider order entry (“CPOE”) should be the preferred method for submitting orders, as it allows providers to directly enter orders into the electronic health record.
- In the event that a CPOE or written order cannot be submitted, a verbal order is acceptable.
- The use of secure text orders is not permitted at this time.
The Joint Commission mentioned a few interesting factors that influenced this decision. In particular, the focus was on the technical capabilities of the modality of the communication. It noted that secure text messaging of an order is an asynchronous interaction, whereas a verbal order allows for a real-time, synchronous clarification and confirmation of the order with the ordering practitioner. Similarly, if a clinical decision support recommendation or other alert is triggered during the order entry process, the individual entering the order may need to contact the ordering practitioner for additional information. When this type of alert is triggered during the entry of a verbal order, the entering practitioner can immediately discuss the issue with the ordering practitioner. However, if this occurs with a text order, the delay in communication between the entering practitioner and the ordering practitioner may cause a delay in treatment.
Many of the Joint Commission’s data privacy and security concerns had been addressed through recent technological developments in the health care application space. Despite these advancements, the Joint Commission remains concerned about transmitting text orders even through a secure text messaging system due to the unknown impact of secure text orders on patient safety. The Joint Commission will continue to monitor advancements in the field, and will determine whether future guidance on the use of secure text messaging is warranted.
Secure text messaging may be a convenient mode of communication for practitioners, but this recent guidance indicates that the Joint Commission and CMS do not approve of this use at hospitals or other health care organizations. Health care organizations should update their policies and procedures to ensure that text messaging in any form (secured or unsecured) is not permitted within the organization.
For more information on telemedicine, telehealth, virtual care, and other health innovations, including the team, publications, and other materials, visit Foley’s Telemedicine and Virtual Care Practice.
Powered by WPeMatico